人工智能是一場(chǎng)威脅人類的完美風(fēng)暴
AI is a perfect storm threatening humanity
譯文簡介
正如我們所知，人工智能可能會(huì)帶來世界末日——但不是以大多數(shù)人所期望的方式
正文翻譯
Artificial intelligence may bring about the end of the world as we know it – but not in the way most would expect
正如我們所知，人工智能可能會(huì)帶來世界末日——但不是以大多數(shù)人所期望的方式
The global economy was already navigating a minefield of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) when US President Donald J. Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs reverberated across international markets. This aggressive escalation of trade barriers, including a mélange of sudden rate hikes, retaliatory measures, and rhetorical brinkmanship, didn’t just amplify the chaos; it ignited the specter of a full-blown economic firestorm.
全球經(jīng)濟(jì)早已在波動(dòng)性、不確定性、復(fù)雜性和模糊性（VUCA）的雷區(qū)中艱難前行，而美國總統(tǒng)唐納德·J·特朗普的“解放日”關(guān)稅卻在國際市場(chǎng)上引發(fā)了震動(dòng)。這種激進(jìn)的貿(mào)易壁壘升級(jí)，包括突然的稅率上調(diào)、報(bào)復(fù)性措施和口頭上的邊緣政策，不僅放大了混亂，還點(diǎn)燃了一場(chǎng)全面經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)暴的幽靈。
Volatility unleashed
The moment the tariffs were announced, markets convulsed. Stock indices plummeted, erasing $2.1 trillion in global market cap within days, while currency markets whipsawed as traders scrambled to price in the fallout. Supply chains, still reeling from pandemic-era disruptions, faced new shocks. Factories in Vietnam scrambled to reroute shipments, German automakers recalculated production costs overnight, and Chinese exporters braced for 145% retaliatory duties on key goods. The tariffs acted like a sledgehammer to an already teetering Jenga tower of global trade, with each blow amplifying volatility far beyond their intended targets.
波動(dòng)性爆發(fā)
關(guān)稅宣布的那一刻，市場(chǎng)劇烈震蕩。全球股市指數(shù)暴跌，幾天內(nèi)蒸發(fā)了2.1萬億美元的全球市值，而貨幣市場(chǎng)則因交易員爭相評(píng)估后果而劇烈波動(dòng)。供應(yīng)鏈仍在從疫情時(shí)期的干擾中恢復(fù)，又面臨新的沖擊。越南的工廠匆忙重新安排運(yùn)輸，德國汽車制造商連夜重新計(jì)算生產(chǎn)成本，中國出口商則為關(guān)鍵商品面臨的145%報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅做準(zhǔn)備。關(guān)稅就像一把大錘，砸向本已搖搖欲墜的全球貿(mào)易積木塔，每一擊都將波動(dòng)性遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)放大，超出了其預(yù)定目標(biāo)。
Uncertainty weaponized
While volatility reigned, the tariff war between the United States and China introduced a deeper, more corrosive uncertainty. Businesses accustomed to stable trade rules now faced policy seesaws. Exemptions granted one day were revoked almost overnight while the constant threat of broader tariffs were dangled without clarity on timing or scope.
CEOs delayed investments, fearing sudden cost hikes. The Federal Reserve, already grappling with inflation, found itself trapped in a Catch-22 situation: raise rates to tame inflation and risk recession, or hold steady and watch confidence erode. Meanwhile, allies like the EU and Canada retaliated with precision strikes on politically sensitive US exports, ranging from bourbon to motorcycles, threatening 2.6 million American jobs at one point. The potential unemployment tallies just kept rising worldwide.
The message was clear: no one was safe from the fallout.
不確定性被武器化
在波動(dòng)性肆虐的同時(shí)，美國與中國之間的關(guān)稅戰(zhàn)引入了一種更深層、更具腐蝕性的不確定性。習(xí)慣于穩(wěn)定貿(mào)易規(guī)則的企業(yè)如今面臨政策的大起大落。一天前獲得的豁免幾乎在一夜之間被撤銷，而更廣泛關(guān)稅的持續(xù)威脅懸而未決，時(shí)間和范圍均無明確說明。
首席執(zhí)行官們推遲了投資，擔(dān)心成本突然上漲。已經(jīng)應(yīng)對(duì)通貨膨脹的美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己陷入進(jìn)退兩難的境地：提高利率以遏制通脹可能引發(fā)衰退，或保持穩(wěn)定則眼看信心逐漸侵蝕。與此同時(shí)，歐盟和加拿大等盟友對(duì)政治上敏感的美國出口產(chǎn)品（如波本威士忌和摩托車）實(shí)施精準(zhǔn)報(bào)復(fù)性打擊，一度威脅到260萬個(gè)美國就業(yè)崗位。全球潛在的失業(yè)人數(shù)持續(xù)上升。
信息很明確：沒有人能從這場(chǎng)余波中幸免。
Complexity spirals out of control
As the trade war escalated, the global economic order began to fracture. Nations abandoned decades of multilateralism in favor of ad hoc alliances. China fast-tracked deals with the EU and ASEAN and began to court rivals Japan and India. The US, on the other hand, found itself isolated. Companies, desperate to adapt, began planning redundant supply chains – one for tariff-free markets and another for the US. This only served as a costly and inefficient hedge against further disruptions. Regulatory labyrinths simultaneously emerged overnight. A single auto part might now face several different tariff rates depending on its origin, destination, and material composition. The system now groaned under the weight of its runaway complexity.
復(fù)雜性螺旋失控
隨著貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的升級(jí)，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序開始破裂。各國放棄了數(shù)十年的多邊主義，轉(zhuǎn)而青睞臨時(shí)聯(lián)盟。中國加速與歐盟和東盟達(dá)成交易，并開始拉攏競爭對(duì)手日本和印度。另一方面，美國發(fā)現(xiàn)自己陷入孤立。企業(yè)為了適應(yīng)局勢(shì)，拼命開始規(guī)劃冗余供應(yīng)鏈——一個(gè)針對(duì)免關(guān)稅市場(chǎng)，另一個(gè)針對(duì)美國。這只是對(duì)進(jìn)一步中斷的一種昂貴且低效的對(duì)沖措施。與此同時(shí)，監(jiān)管迷宮一夜之間涌現(xiàn)。一個(gè)汽車零部件現(xiàn)在可能因其原產(chǎn)地、目的地和材料構(gòu)成而面臨幾種不同的關(guān)稅稅率。整個(gè)系統(tǒng)在失控的復(fù)雜性重壓下不堪重負(fù)。
Ambiguity: Strategy or stumbling block?
Worst of all was the ambiguity. Trump frxd the tariffs as a “negotiating tool” to revive US manufacturing, yet no coherent industrial policy followed. Were these temporary measures or a permanent decoupling from China? Would they actually bring jobs back, or simply raise prices for consumers? The administration’s mixed signals left allies questioning America’s reliability and adversaries probing for weakness. Geopolitically, the tariffs accelerated a crisis of trust. NATO allies doubted US commitments, Southeast Asian nations hedged toward Beijing, and the Global South explored alternatives to the dollar. The longer the ambiguity persisted, the more the world adapted to a reality where the US was no longer the anchor of the global economy.
What makes these tariffs uniquely dangerous is their role as a VUCA multiplier. They don’t just create volatility – they lock it in. Uncertainty doesn’t subside – it metastasizes. Complexity isn’t resolved – it becomes the new normal. And ambiguity isn’t clarified – it is weaponized. The result is a self-reinforcing cycle: tariffs provoke retaliation, which fuels inflation, which strains central banks, which spooks investors, which forces more protectionism. Meanwhile, the dollar’s dominance erodes, supply chains Balkanize, and businesses lose faith in long-term planning.
模糊性：戰(zhàn)略還是絆腳石？
最糟糕的是模糊性。特朗普將關(guān)稅說成是重振美國制造業(yè)的“談判工具”，卻并未出臺(tái)連貫的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。這些措施究竟是暫時(shí)的，還是意味著與中國的永久脫鉤？它們真的能帶回就業(yè)崗位，還是僅僅提高消費(fèi)者的價(jià)格？美國政府發(fā)出的混雜信號(hào)，讓盟友質(zhì)疑美國的可靠性，也讓對(duì)手們開始探尋美國的弱點(diǎn)。從地緣政治角度來看，關(guān)稅加劇了信任危機(jī)。北約盟友懷疑美國的承諾，東南亞國家對(duì)北京采取避險(xiǎn)措施，而全球南方國家則探索美元的替代方案。這種模糊性持續(xù)的時(shí)間越長，世界就越適應(yīng)美國不再是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)支柱的現(xiàn)實(shí)。
這些關(guān)稅之所以格外危險(xiǎn)，是因?yàn)樗鼈儼缪葜翱勺冃?、不穩(wěn)定性、不穩(wěn)定性”（VUCA）乘數(shù)的角色。它們不僅制造波動(dòng)，還會(huì)將波動(dòng)鎖定。不確定性不會(huì)消退，而是會(huì)不斷擴(kuò)散。復(fù)雜性未得到解決，反而成為新常態(tài)。模糊性未得到澄清，反而被當(dāng)作武器。結(jié)果形成了一個(gè)自我強(qiáng)化的循環(huán)：關(guān)稅引發(fā)報(bào)復(fù)，加劇通脹，給央行帶來壓力，令投資者感到恐慌，最終迫使保護(hù)主義抬頭。與此同時(shí)，美元的主導(dǎo)地位受到削弱，供應(yīng)鏈分裂，企業(yè)對(duì)長期規(guī)劃失去信心。
AI as the VUCA force multiplier
When the first round of tariffs was imposed by Washington DC, traditional economic models anticipated familiar disruptions in the form of market corrections, supply chain adjustments, and eventual equilibrium. What these models missed was the presence of a new wildcard – AI systems that don’t just respond to volatility but can amplify it. Algorithmic trading platforms and predictive logistics tools, operating on assumptions of continuity, struggled to adapt to the sudden, chaotic shifts introduced by trade barriers. In some sectors, this has led to mismatches between inventory and demand, not because of human misjudgement, but due to machine learning models which are ill-equipped to handle the cascading effects of cross-sectoral VUCA.
AI is indeed accelerating the fragmentation of the global economic order. As nations implement competing AI systems to manage trade flows, we may see the emergence of parallel digital realities. One country’s customs AI might classify a product as tariff-free while another’s system slaps it with prohibitive duties. This isn’t just bureaucratic confusion; it represents the breakdown of shared frxworks that have enabled global commerce for decades. We used to worry about trade wars between nations; now we should worry about conflicts between the machines built to manage them. In a hypothetical future, trade wars will be fought by rival AI systems fighting proxy battles through markets, logistics, and information. Personally, I doubt this planet has scope for another crisis beyond this one, as Albert Einstein’s adage that WW4 will be fought with “sticks and stones” comes to mind.
人工智能作為VUCA力量倍增器
當(dāng)華盛頓特區(qū)實(shí)施第一輪關(guān)稅時(shí)，傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)模型預(yù)測(cè)會(huì)出現(xiàn)一些常見的市場(chǎng)調(diào)整、供應(yīng)鏈調(diào)整以及最終的均衡。這些模型忽略了一個(gè)新的不確定因素——人工智能系統(tǒng)，它不僅能應(yīng)對(duì)波動(dòng)，還能放大波動(dòng)。基于連續(xù)性假設(shè)的算法交易平臺(tái)和預(yù)測(cè)物流工具難以適應(yīng)貿(mào)易壁壘帶來的突發(fā)性混亂變化。在某些行業(yè)，這導(dǎo)致了庫存與需求之間的錯(cuò)配，這并非人為誤判，而是由于機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)模型無法應(yīng)對(duì)跨行業(yè)VUCA的連鎖效應(yīng)。
人工智能確實(shí)正在加速全球經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序的碎片化。隨著各國紛紛采用相互競爭的人工智能系統(tǒng)來管理貿(mào)易流動(dòng)，我們可能會(huì)看到平行的數(shù)字現(xiàn)實(shí)的出現(xiàn)。一個(gè)國家的海關(guān)人工智能可能將某種產(chǎn)品歸類為免關(guān)稅，而另一個(gè)國家的系統(tǒng)則對(duì)其征收高額關(guān)稅。這不僅僅是官僚主義的混亂，它代表著數(shù)十年來支撐全球貿(mào)易的共享框架的崩潰。我們過去常常擔(dān)心國家之間的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)；現(xiàn)在，我們應(yīng)該擔(dān)心那些為管理貿(mào)易而生的機(jī)器之間的沖突。假設(shè)未來，貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)將由相互競爭的人工智能系統(tǒng)通過市場(chǎng)、物流和信息進(jìn)行代理戰(zhàn)。我個(gè)人懷疑，除了這場(chǎng)危機(jī)之外，這個(gè)星球是否還能再承受一場(chǎng)危機(jī)，這讓我想起了阿爾伯特·愛因斯坦的名言：第四次世界大戰(zhàn)將用“棍棒和石頭”來打。
In the midst of the ongoing VUCA torrent, many clueless bureaucrats and executives have quietly turned to AI, particularly GPTs, to make sense of the myriad crises facing their nations and institutions. Many flawed decisions may have been made and sums allocated for “future-proofing.” Let me tell you why this is a recipe for disaster: one prominent GPT model gave me not one but five (5) erroneous and wholly-fictitious examples of how AI had messed up the post-Liberation Day geo-economic landscape. And here is the scary part: only those well-versed in complex systems, global risks and AI would have discerned those flaws. Otherwise, the scenarios generated by the GPT model were generally more accurate than most of those voiced by pundits on prime time television.
Why did the GPT model make such mistakes? I am convinced that AI is being surreptitiously used to sift out the gullible from the indispensable, perhaps in preparation for a post-VUCA world. But that remains a relatively optimistic theory!
在持續(xù)不斷的VUCA洪流中，許多一無所知的官僚和高管悄悄地轉(zhuǎn)向人工智能，尤其是通用技術(shù)（GPT），以理解他們國家和機(jī)構(gòu)面臨的無數(shù)危機(jī)。他們可能做出了許多錯(cuò)誤的決策，并撥出大量資金用于“未來防患于未然”。讓我來告訴你為什么這會(huì)導(dǎo)致災(zāi)難：一個(gè)著名的GPT模型給了我不止一個(gè)，而是五個(gè)完全虛構(gòu)的錯(cuò)誤例子，說明人工智能如何擾亂了解放日后的地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)格局?？膳碌氖牵褐挥心切┚◤?fù)雜系統(tǒng)、全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和人工智能的人才能辨別出這些缺陷。否則，GPT模型生成的情景通常比黃金時(shí)段電視上大多數(shù)專家提出的情景更準(zhǔn)確。
為什么GPT模型會(huì)犯這樣的錯(cuò)誤？我確信，人工智能正被暗中用來篩選那些容易上當(dāng)?shù)娜撕筒豢苫蛉钡娜耍蛟S是為了為后VUCA時(shí)代做準(zhǔn)備。但這仍然是一個(gè)相對(duì)樂觀的理論！
Mass unemployment ahead?
AI and VUCA are rapidly converging to create the preconditions for the worst unemployment crisis since the Industrial Revolution. Back then, the West could resort to new markets in the form of colonies. This time, however, there are no new territories left to colonize – only the continued cannibalization of societies themselves. The accelerating spiral of global wealth inequality is not an anomaly; it is the clearest symptom of this internalized exploitation.
The world is not merely staring at job losses in specific sectors. No, this is about the simultaneous breakdown of multiple stabilizing mechanisms that have historically absorbed economic shocks.
Russia’s Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadaev recently claimed that half of his nation’s civil servants could be replaced by AI. Shadaev, however, noted that certain professions, such as doctors and teachers, cannot be replaced. Bill Gates thinks otherwise. He predicts that AI will swiftly replace humans in nearly every professional sphere, including teaching and medicine. For once, I wholly agree with Gates.
So, what do we do with the “excess humans”? Institute a CBDC-mediated rationing system as a stop-gap measure?
大規(guī)模失業(yè)即將來臨？
人工智能和VUCA正在迅速融合，為工業(yè)革命以來最嚴(yán)重的失業(yè)危機(jī)創(chuàng)造先決條件。當(dāng)時(shí)，西方可以以殖民地的形式開拓新市場(chǎng)。然而，這一次，沒有新的領(lǐng)土可供殖民——只有社會(huì)自身持續(xù)的蠶食。全球貧富差距的加速螺旋并非異?，F(xiàn)象；它是這種內(nèi)化剝削最明顯的癥狀。
世界不僅僅是盯著特定行業(yè)的失業(yè)。不，這是關(guān)于歷史上吸收經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊的多個(gè)穩(wěn)定機(jī)制同時(shí)崩潰的問題。
俄羅斯數(shù)字發(fā)展部長馬克蘇特·沙達(dá)耶夫最近聲稱，該國一半的公務(wù)員可能會(huì)被人工智能取代。然而，沙達(dá)耶夫指出，某些職業(yè)，例如醫(yī)生和教師，是無法被取代的。比爾·蓋茨卻不這么認(rèn)為。他預(yù)測(cè)，人工智能將在幾乎所有專業(yè)領(lǐng)域迅速取代人類，包括教學(xué)和醫(yī)學(xué)。這一次，我完全同意蓋茨的觀點(diǎn)。
那么，我們?cè)撊绾翁幚磉@些“過剩人口”呢？建立一個(gè)由CBDC介導(dǎo)的配給制度作為權(quán)宜之計(jì)嗎？
Culmination of systemic global corruption
The VUCA-AI quagmire unfolding today is the consequence of decades of entrenched patronage systems that were perfected in the West and subsequently exported to the Third World. These were intrinsically corrupt systems that rewarded compliant mediocrity over critical thought. In sidelining genuine thinkers, these structures forfeited any real chance of forging a balanced, intelligent response to the collision between VUCA dynamics and artificial intelligence.
In the end, we are left with a world designed by clowns and supervised by monkeys, to borrow a phrase from a disillusioned Boeing pilot. Many Third World pundits and policymakers, themselves products of the West’s neocolonial machinery, are now advocating a wholesale pivot towards the BRICS bloc. Like courtiers in a globalist brothel suddenly desperate for new clientele, these elites now decry the very “inequalities” that once elevated them to cushy posts – at the expense of the citizens they claim to represent.
As far back as 1970, the Nobel Laureate Albert Szent-Gy?rgyi had warned of the consequences of the “terrible strain of idiots who govern the world.” Szent-Gy?rgyi, who bagged the Nobel Prize in Medicine (1937) for discovering Vitamin C had however hoped that the youth of the future would save humanity from a gerontocracy that cannot “assimilate new ideas.”
全球系統(tǒng)性腐敗的頂峰
如今正在上演的VUCA-AI泥潭，是數(shù)十年來根深蒂固的庇護(hù)體系的后果。這種體系在西方完善后，隨后被輸出到第三世界。這些體系本質(zhì)上是腐敗的，它獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的是順從的平庸之輩，而非批判性思考。由于將真正的思考者邊緣化，這些體系喪失了任何真正構(gòu)建平衡、智慧的應(yīng)對(duì)VUCA動(dòng)力與人工智能碰撞的機(jī)會(huì)。
最終，我們只剩下一個(gè)由小丑設(shè)計(jì)、由猴子監(jiān)督的世界——借用一位失望的波音飛行員的話來說。許多第三世界的專家和政策制定者，本身就是西方新殖民主義機(jī)器的產(chǎn)物，如今卻鼓吹全面轉(zhuǎn)向金磚國家集團(tuán)。就像全球主義妓院里的朝臣突然渴望新的客戶一樣，這些精英們現(xiàn)在譴責(zé)那些曾經(jīng)將他們推上舒適職位的“不平等”——而犧牲的卻是他們聲稱代表的公民。
早在1970年，諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)得主阿爾伯特·圣捷爾吉就曾警告過“統(tǒng)治世界的可怕白癡”所帶來的后果。圣捷爾吉因發(fā)現(xiàn)維生素C而榮獲1937年諾貝爾醫(yī)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)，但他也曾希望未來的年輕人能夠拯救人類，使其免于無法“吸收新思想”的老人政治。
Little did he know that the same gerontocracy had already hatched a plan to create a new breed of “young global leaders” – even children – who were more feckless and pliant than their predecessors. This may have been the real raison d’etre behind the World Economic Forum. Personally, I can find no other justification behind the founding of this institution.
In the end, individuals with real ideas – both young and old – have largely abandoned a system that no longer rewards insight, only compliance. Their views no longer appear on search engines as Big Tech had employed a variety of pretexts to shadowban their viewpoints.
However, the day may come when the phones of ideators may start ringing again in the quest for “solutions”. It will be too late by then.
他根本不知道，同樣的老人政治已經(jīng)制定了一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃，要打造一批新一代的“年輕全球領(lǐng)袖”——甚至包括孩子——他們比他們的前輩更加軟弱無能、唯命是從。這或許才是世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇存在的真正理由。就我個(gè)人而言，我實(shí)在找不到成立這個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)的其他理由。
最終，擁有真正想法的人——無論老少——基本上已經(jīng)放棄了這個(gè)不再獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)洞察力、只獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)順從的體系。他們的觀點(diǎn)不再出現(xiàn)在搜索引擎上，因?yàn)榇笮涂萍脊疽呀?jīng)用各種借口對(duì)他們的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行暗中屏蔽。
然而，或許有一天，思想家們的電話會(huì)再次響起，尋求“解決方案”。到那時(shí)就太晚了。
正如我們所知，人工智能可能會(huì)帶來世界末日——但不是以大多數(shù)人所期望的方式
The global economy was already navigating a minefield of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) when US President Donald J. Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs reverberated across international markets. This aggressive escalation of trade barriers, including a mélange of sudden rate hikes, retaliatory measures, and rhetorical brinkmanship, didn’t just amplify the chaos; it ignited the specter of a full-blown economic firestorm.
全球經(jīng)濟(jì)早已在波動(dòng)性、不確定性、復(fù)雜性和模糊性（VUCA）的雷區(qū)中艱難前行，而美國總統(tǒng)唐納德·J·特朗普的“解放日”關(guān)稅卻在國際市場(chǎng)上引發(fā)了震動(dòng)。這種激進(jìn)的貿(mào)易壁壘升級(jí)，包括突然的稅率上調(diào)、報(bào)復(fù)性措施和口頭上的邊緣政策，不僅放大了混亂，還點(diǎn)燃了一場(chǎng)全面經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)暴的幽靈。
Volatility unleashed
The moment the tariffs were announced, markets convulsed. Stock indices plummeted, erasing $2.1 trillion in global market cap within days, while currency markets whipsawed as traders scrambled to price in the fallout. Supply chains, still reeling from pandemic-era disruptions, faced new shocks. Factories in Vietnam scrambled to reroute shipments, German automakers recalculated production costs overnight, and Chinese exporters braced for 145% retaliatory duties on key goods. The tariffs acted like a sledgehammer to an already teetering Jenga tower of global trade, with each blow amplifying volatility far beyond their intended targets.
波動(dòng)性爆發(fā)
關(guān)稅宣布的那一刻，市場(chǎng)劇烈震蕩。全球股市指數(shù)暴跌，幾天內(nèi)蒸發(fā)了2.1萬億美元的全球市值，而貨幣市場(chǎng)則因交易員爭相評(píng)估后果而劇烈波動(dòng)。供應(yīng)鏈仍在從疫情時(shí)期的干擾中恢復(fù)，又面臨新的沖擊。越南的工廠匆忙重新安排運(yùn)輸，德國汽車制造商連夜重新計(jì)算生產(chǎn)成本，中國出口商則為關(guān)鍵商品面臨的145%報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅做準(zhǔn)備。關(guān)稅就像一把大錘，砸向本已搖搖欲墜的全球貿(mào)易積木塔，每一擊都將波動(dòng)性遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)放大，超出了其預(yù)定目標(biāo)。
Uncertainty weaponized
While volatility reigned, the tariff war between the United States and China introduced a deeper, more corrosive uncertainty. Businesses accustomed to stable trade rules now faced policy seesaws. Exemptions granted one day were revoked almost overnight while the constant threat of broader tariffs were dangled without clarity on timing or scope.
CEOs delayed investments, fearing sudden cost hikes. The Federal Reserve, already grappling with inflation, found itself trapped in a Catch-22 situation: raise rates to tame inflation and risk recession, or hold steady and watch confidence erode. Meanwhile, allies like the EU and Canada retaliated with precision strikes on politically sensitive US exports, ranging from bourbon to motorcycles, threatening 2.6 million American jobs at one point. The potential unemployment tallies just kept rising worldwide.
The message was clear: no one was safe from the fallout.
不確定性被武器化
在波動(dòng)性肆虐的同時(shí)，美國與中國之間的關(guān)稅戰(zhàn)引入了一種更深層、更具腐蝕性的不確定性。習(xí)慣于穩(wěn)定貿(mào)易規(guī)則的企業(yè)如今面臨政策的大起大落。一天前獲得的豁免幾乎在一夜之間被撤銷，而更廣泛關(guān)稅的持續(xù)威脅懸而未決，時(shí)間和范圍均無明確說明。
首席執(zhí)行官們推遲了投資，擔(dān)心成本突然上漲。已經(jīng)應(yīng)對(duì)通貨膨脹的美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己陷入進(jìn)退兩難的境地：提高利率以遏制通脹可能引發(fā)衰退，或保持穩(wěn)定則眼看信心逐漸侵蝕。與此同時(shí)，歐盟和加拿大等盟友對(duì)政治上敏感的美國出口產(chǎn)品（如波本威士忌和摩托車）實(shí)施精準(zhǔn)報(bào)復(fù)性打擊，一度威脅到260萬個(gè)美國就業(yè)崗位。全球潛在的失業(yè)人數(shù)持續(xù)上升。
信息很明確：沒有人能從這場(chǎng)余波中幸免。
Complexity spirals out of control
As the trade war escalated, the global economic order began to fracture. Nations abandoned decades of multilateralism in favor of ad hoc alliances. China fast-tracked deals with the EU and ASEAN and began to court rivals Japan and India. The US, on the other hand, found itself isolated. Companies, desperate to adapt, began planning redundant supply chains – one for tariff-free markets and another for the US. This only served as a costly and inefficient hedge against further disruptions. Regulatory labyrinths simultaneously emerged overnight. A single auto part might now face several different tariff rates depending on its origin, destination, and material composition. The system now groaned under the weight of its runaway complexity.
復(fù)雜性螺旋失控
隨著貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的升級(jí)，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序開始破裂。各國放棄了數(shù)十年的多邊主義，轉(zhuǎn)而青睞臨時(shí)聯(lián)盟。中國加速與歐盟和東盟達(dá)成交易，并開始拉攏競爭對(duì)手日本和印度。另一方面，美國發(fā)現(xiàn)自己陷入孤立。企業(yè)為了適應(yīng)局勢(shì)，拼命開始規(guī)劃冗余供應(yīng)鏈——一個(gè)針對(duì)免關(guān)稅市場(chǎng)，另一個(gè)針對(duì)美國。這只是對(duì)進(jìn)一步中斷的一種昂貴且低效的對(duì)沖措施。與此同時(shí)，監(jiān)管迷宮一夜之間涌現(xiàn)。一個(gè)汽車零部件現(xiàn)在可能因其原產(chǎn)地、目的地和材料構(gòu)成而面臨幾種不同的關(guān)稅稅率。整個(gè)系統(tǒng)在失控的復(fù)雜性重壓下不堪重負(fù)。
Ambiguity: Strategy or stumbling block?
Worst of all was the ambiguity. Trump frxd the tariffs as a “negotiating tool” to revive US manufacturing, yet no coherent industrial policy followed. Were these temporary measures or a permanent decoupling from China? Would they actually bring jobs back, or simply raise prices for consumers? The administration’s mixed signals left allies questioning America’s reliability and adversaries probing for weakness. Geopolitically, the tariffs accelerated a crisis of trust. NATO allies doubted US commitments, Southeast Asian nations hedged toward Beijing, and the Global South explored alternatives to the dollar. The longer the ambiguity persisted, the more the world adapted to a reality where the US was no longer the anchor of the global economy.
What makes these tariffs uniquely dangerous is their role as a VUCA multiplier. They don’t just create volatility – they lock it in. Uncertainty doesn’t subside – it metastasizes. Complexity isn’t resolved – it becomes the new normal. And ambiguity isn’t clarified – it is weaponized. The result is a self-reinforcing cycle: tariffs provoke retaliation, which fuels inflation, which strains central banks, which spooks investors, which forces more protectionism. Meanwhile, the dollar’s dominance erodes, supply chains Balkanize, and businesses lose faith in long-term planning.
模糊性：戰(zhàn)略還是絆腳石？
最糟糕的是模糊性。特朗普將關(guān)稅說成是重振美國制造業(yè)的“談判工具”，卻并未出臺(tái)連貫的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。這些措施究竟是暫時(shí)的，還是意味著與中國的永久脫鉤？它們真的能帶回就業(yè)崗位，還是僅僅提高消費(fèi)者的價(jià)格？美國政府發(fā)出的混雜信號(hào)，讓盟友質(zhì)疑美國的可靠性，也讓對(duì)手們開始探尋美國的弱點(diǎn)。從地緣政治角度來看，關(guān)稅加劇了信任危機(jī)。北約盟友懷疑美國的承諾，東南亞國家對(duì)北京采取避險(xiǎn)措施，而全球南方國家則探索美元的替代方案。這種模糊性持續(xù)的時(shí)間越長，世界就越適應(yīng)美國不再是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)支柱的現(xiàn)實(shí)。
這些關(guān)稅之所以格外危險(xiǎn)，是因?yàn)樗鼈儼缪葜翱勺冃?、不穩(wěn)定性、不穩(wěn)定性”（VUCA）乘數(shù)的角色。它們不僅制造波動(dòng)，還會(huì)將波動(dòng)鎖定。不確定性不會(huì)消退，而是會(huì)不斷擴(kuò)散。復(fù)雜性未得到解決，反而成為新常態(tài)。模糊性未得到澄清，反而被當(dāng)作武器。結(jié)果形成了一個(gè)自我強(qiáng)化的循環(huán)：關(guān)稅引發(fā)報(bào)復(fù)，加劇通脹，給央行帶來壓力，令投資者感到恐慌，最終迫使保護(hù)主義抬頭。與此同時(shí)，美元的主導(dǎo)地位受到削弱，供應(yīng)鏈分裂，企業(yè)對(duì)長期規(guī)劃失去信心。
AI as the VUCA force multiplier
When the first round of tariffs was imposed by Washington DC, traditional economic models anticipated familiar disruptions in the form of market corrections, supply chain adjustments, and eventual equilibrium. What these models missed was the presence of a new wildcard – AI systems that don’t just respond to volatility but can amplify it. Algorithmic trading platforms and predictive logistics tools, operating on assumptions of continuity, struggled to adapt to the sudden, chaotic shifts introduced by trade barriers. In some sectors, this has led to mismatches between inventory and demand, not because of human misjudgement, but due to machine learning models which are ill-equipped to handle the cascading effects of cross-sectoral VUCA.
AI is indeed accelerating the fragmentation of the global economic order. As nations implement competing AI systems to manage trade flows, we may see the emergence of parallel digital realities. One country’s customs AI might classify a product as tariff-free while another’s system slaps it with prohibitive duties. This isn’t just bureaucratic confusion; it represents the breakdown of shared frxworks that have enabled global commerce for decades. We used to worry about trade wars between nations; now we should worry about conflicts between the machines built to manage them. In a hypothetical future, trade wars will be fought by rival AI systems fighting proxy battles through markets, logistics, and information. Personally, I doubt this planet has scope for another crisis beyond this one, as Albert Einstein’s adage that WW4 will be fought with “sticks and stones” comes to mind.
人工智能作為VUCA力量倍增器
當(dāng)華盛頓特區(qū)實(shí)施第一輪關(guān)稅時(shí)，傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)模型預(yù)測(cè)會(huì)出現(xiàn)一些常見的市場(chǎng)調(diào)整、供應(yīng)鏈調(diào)整以及最終的均衡。這些模型忽略了一個(gè)新的不確定因素——人工智能系統(tǒng)，它不僅能應(yīng)對(duì)波動(dòng)，還能放大波動(dòng)。基于連續(xù)性假設(shè)的算法交易平臺(tái)和預(yù)測(cè)物流工具難以適應(yīng)貿(mào)易壁壘帶來的突發(fā)性混亂變化。在某些行業(yè)，這導(dǎo)致了庫存與需求之間的錯(cuò)配，這并非人為誤判，而是由于機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)模型無法應(yīng)對(duì)跨行業(yè)VUCA的連鎖效應(yīng)。
人工智能確實(shí)正在加速全球經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序的碎片化。隨著各國紛紛采用相互競爭的人工智能系統(tǒng)來管理貿(mào)易流動(dòng)，我們可能會(huì)看到平行的數(shù)字現(xiàn)實(shí)的出現(xiàn)。一個(gè)國家的海關(guān)人工智能可能將某種產(chǎn)品歸類為免關(guān)稅，而另一個(gè)國家的系統(tǒng)則對(duì)其征收高額關(guān)稅。這不僅僅是官僚主義的混亂，它代表著數(shù)十年來支撐全球貿(mào)易的共享框架的崩潰。我們過去常常擔(dān)心國家之間的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)；現(xiàn)在，我們應(yīng)該擔(dān)心那些為管理貿(mào)易而生的機(jī)器之間的沖突。假設(shè)未來，貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)將由相互競爭的人工智能系統(tǒng)通過市場(chǎng)、物流和信息進(jìn)行代理戰(zhàn)。我個(gè)人懷疑，除了這場(chǎng)危機(jī)之外，這個(gè)星球是否還能再承受一場(chǎng)危機(jī)，這讓我想起了阿爾伯特·愛因斯坦的名言：第四次世界大戰(zhàn)將用“棍棒和石頭”來打。
In the midst of the ongoing VUCA torrent, many clueless bureaucrats and executives have quietly turned to AI, particularly GPTs, to make sense of the myriad crises facing their nations and institutions. Many flawed decisions may have been made and sums allocated for “future-proofing.” Let me tell you why this is a recipe for disaster: one prominent GPT model gave me not one but five (5) erroneous and wholly-fictitious examples of how AI had messed up the post-Liberation Day geo-economic landscape. And here is the scary part: only those well-versed in complex systems, global risks and AI would have discerned those flaws. Otherwise, the scenarios generated by the GPT model were generally more accurate than most of those voiced by pundits on prime time television.
Why did the GPT model make such mistakes? I am convinced that AI is being surreptitiously used to sift out the gullible from the indispensable, perhaps in preparation for a post-VUCA world. But that remains a relatively optimistic theory!
在持續(xù)不斷的VUCA洪流中，許多一無所知的官僚和高管悄悄地轉(zhuǎn)向人工智能，尤其是通用技術(shù)（GPT），以理解他們國家和機(jī)構(gòu)面臨的無數(shù)危機(jī)。他們可能做出了許多錯(cuò)誤的決策，并撥出大量資金用于“未來防患于未然”。讓我來告訴你為什么這會(huì)導(dǎo)致災(zāi)難：一個(gè)著名的GPT模型給了我不止一個(gè)，而是五個(gè)完全虛構(gòu)的錯(cuò)誤例子，說明人工智能如何擾亂了解放日后的地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)格局?？膳碌氖牵褐挥心切┚◤?fù)雜系統(tǒng)、全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和人工智能的人才能辨別出這些缺陷。否則，GPT模型生成的情景通常比黃金時(shí)段電視上大多數(shù)專家提出的情景更準(zhǔn)確。
為什么GPT模型會(huì)犯這樣的錯(cuò)誤？我確信，人工智能正被暗中用來篩選那些容易上當(dāng)?shù)娜撕筒豢苫蛉钡娜耍蛟S是為了為后VUCA時(shí)代做準(zhǔn)備。但這仍然是一個(gè)相對(duì)樂觀的理論！
Mass unemployment ahead?
AI and VUCA are rapidly converging to create the preconditions for the worst unemployment crisis since the Industrial Revolution. Back then, the West could resort to new markets in the form of colonies. This time, however, there are no new territories left to colonize – only the continued cannibalization of societies themselves. The accelerating spiral of global wealth inequality is not an anomaly; it is the clearest symptom of this internalized exploitation.
The world is not merely staring at job losses in specific sectors. No, this is about the simultaneous breakdown of multiple stabilizing mechanisms that have historically absorbed economic shocks.
Russia’s Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadaev recently claimed that half of his nation’s civil servants could be replaced by AI. Shadaev, however, noted that certain professions, such as doctors and teachers, cannot be replaced. Bill Gates thinks otherwise. He predicts that AI will swiftly replace humans in nearly every professional sphere, including teaching and medicine. For once, I wholly agree with Gates.
So, what do we do with the “excess humans”? Institute a CBDC-mediated rationing system as a stop-gap measure?
大規(guī)模失業(yè)即將來臨？
人工智能和VUCA正在迅速融合，為工業(yè)革命以來最嚴(yán)重的失業(yè)危機(jī)創(chuàng)造先決條件。當(dāng)時(shí)，西方可以以殖民地的形式開拓新市場(chǎng)。然而，這一次，沒有新的領(lǐng)土可供殖民——只有社會(huì)自身持續(xù)的蠶食。全球貧富差距的加速螺旋并非異?，F(xiàn)象；它是這種內(nèi)化剝削最明顯的癥狀。
世界不僅僅是盯著特定行業(yè)的失業(yè)。不，這是關(guān)于歷史上吸收經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊的多個(gè)穩(wěn)定機(jī)制同時(shí)崩潰的問題。
俄羅斯數(shù)字發(fā)展部長馬克蘇特·沙達(dá)耶夫最近聲稱，該國一半的公務(wù)員可能會(huì)被人工智能取代。然而，沙達(dá)耶夫指出，某些職業(yè)，例如醫(yī)生和教師，是無法被取代的。比爾·蓋茨卻不這么認(rèn)為。他預(yù)測(cè)，人工智能將在幾乎所有專業(yè)領(lǐng)域迅速取代人類，包括教學(xué)和醫(yī)學(xué)。這一次，我完全同意蓋茨的觀點(diǎn)。
那么，我們?cè)撊绾翁幚磉@些“過剩人口”呢？建立一個(gè)由CBDC介導(dǎo)的配給制度作為權(quán)宜之計(jì)嗎？
Culmination of systemic global corruption
The VUCA-AI quagmire unfolding today is the consequence of decades of entrenched patronage systems that were perfected in the West and subsequently exported to the Third World. These were intrinsically corrupt systems that rewarded compliant mediocrity over critical thought. In sidelining genuine thinkers, these structures forfeited any real chance of forging a balanced, intelligent response to the collision between VUCA dynamics and artificial intelligence.
In the end, we are left with a world designed by clowns and supervised by monkeys, to borrow a phrase from a disillusioned Boeing pilot. Many Third World pundits and policymakers, themselves products of the West’s neocolonial machinery, are now advocating a wholesale pivot towards the BRICS bloc. Like courtiers in a globalist brothel suddenly desperate for new clientele, these elites now decry the very “inequalities” that once elevated them to cushy posts – at the expense of the citizens they claim to represent.
As far back as 1970, the Nobel Laureate Albert Szent-Gy?rgyi had warned of the consequences of the “terrible strain of idiots who govern the world.” Szent-Gy?rgyi, who bagged the Nobel Prize in Medicine (1937) for discovering Vitamin C had however hoped that the youth of the future would save humanity from a gerontocracy that cannot “assimilate new ideas.”
全球系統(tǒng)性腐敗的頂峰
如今正在上演的VUCA-AI泥潭，是數(shù)十年來根深蒂固的庇護(hù)體系的后果。這種體系在西方完善后，隨后被輸出到第三世界。這些體系本質(zhì)上是腐敗的，它獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的是順從的平庸之輩，而非批判性思考。由于將真正的思考者邊緣化，這些體系喪失了任何真正構(gòu)建平衡、智慧的應(yīng)對(duì)VUCA動(dòng)力與人工智能碰撞的機(jī)會(huì)。
最終，我們只剩下一個(gè)由小丑設(shè)計(jì)、由猴子監(jiān)督的世界——借用一位失望的波音飛行員的話來說。許多第三世界的專家和政策制定者，本身就是西方新殖民主義機(jī)器的產(chǎn)物，如今卻鼓吹全面轉(zhuǎn)向金磚國家集團(tuán)。就像全球主義妓院里的朝臣突然渴望新的客戶一樣，這些精英們現(xiàn)在譴責(zé)那些曾經(jīng)將他們推上舒適職位的“不平等”——而犧牲的卻是他們聲稱代表的公民。
早在1970年，諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)得主阿爾伯特·圣捷爾吉就曾警告過“統(tǒng)治世界的可怕白癡”所帶來的后果。圣捷爾吉因發(fā)現(xiàn)維生素C而榮獲1937年諾貝爾醫(yī)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)，但他也曾希望未來的年輕人能夠拯救人類，使其免于無法“吸收新思想”的老人政治。
Little did he know that the same gerontocracy had already hatched a plan to create a new breed of “young global leaders” – even children – who were more feckless and pliant than their predecessors. This may have been the real raison d’etre behind the World Economic Forum. Personally, I can find no other justification behind the founding of this institution.
In the end, individuals with real ideas – both young and old – have largely abandoned a system that no longer rewards insight, only compliance. Their views no longer appear on search engines as Big Tech had employed a variety of pretexts to shadowban their viewpoints.
However, the day may come when the phones of ideators may start ringing again in the quest for “solutions”. It will be too late by then.
他根本不知道，同樣的老人政治已經(jīng)制定了一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃，要打造一批新一代的“年輕全球領(lǐng)袖”——甚至包括孩子——他們比他們的前輩更加軟弱無能、唯命是從。這或許才是世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇存在的真正理由。就我個(gè)人而言，我實(shí)在找不到成立這個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)的其他理由。
最終，擁有真正想法的人——無論老少——基本上已經(jīng)放棄了這個(gè)不再獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)洞察力、只獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)順從的體系。他們的觀點(diǎn)不再出現(xiàn)在搜索引擎上，因?yàn)榇笮涂萍脊疽呀?jīng)用各種借口對(duì)他們的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行暗中屏蔽。
然而，或許有一天，思想家們的電話會(huì)再次響起，尋求“解決方案”。到那時(shí)就太晚了。
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Dohn Joe
Normal, rational people know that the AI is a PSYCHOSIS. There are too many invented dangers about the AI.
Let’s think logic. The AI is nothing more than a glorified type of software. A program written by humans with data entered by humans as programmers. The processing of data will never have the complexity of the human brain. A software will never have self identity, life, and soul. The only ?danger? is the fakes created with the AI software. Video fakes, audio fakes, written fakes. Nothing even close to the ?end of the world?. Computers programming existed for a long time and it is up to humans if they use it for good or bad choices. The psychosis of the AI makes me remember the Y2K hoax when a similar false danger was launched. Reality showed that Y2K ?virus? was nothing but hot air and cheap manipulation.
正常、理性的人知道，人工智能是一種“精神病”。關(guān)于人工智能的危險(xiǎn)被夸大了太多。
讓我們理性思考。人工智能不過是一種被美化的軟件。由人類編寫的程序，數(shù)據(jù)由作為程序員的人類輸入。數(shù)據(jù)的處理永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)有人類大腦的復(fù)雜性。軟件永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)有自我身份、生命和靈魂。唯一的“危險(xiǎn)”是人工智能軟件制造的假象。視頻假象、音頻假象、文字假象。完全談不上“世界末日”。計(jì)算機(jī)編程已經(jīng)存在了很長時(shí)間，由人類決定是用它做好事還是壞事。人工智能的“精神病”讓我想起Y2K騙局，當(dāng)時(shí)一個(gè)類似的虛假危險(xiǎn)被推出。現(xiàn)實(shí)表明，Y2K“病毒”不過是空話和廉價(jià)的操縱。
Pragmatist_in_another_guise
Yes, ‘AI’ is software. Its most worrisome feature is not some alleged propensity for morphing into a malignant super-brain but, instead, its impenetrability.
‘AI’ is a ‘black box’. When appropriately ‘trained’ it can do some superficially amazing things, e.g. image manipulation, and it may recognise patterns among complicated data which have eluded human observers. A useful tool.
After the software/hardware combination has been ‘trained’, ‘the how’ concerning the AI’s arrival at a particular response to a query is elusive even to the software’s creators. There lies the danger. People for whom the inner workings of AI are as opaque as those of a slide-rule could misplace trust in AI’s abilities, else they may harbour irrational fears imputing motivation to AIs.
是的，“人工智能”是軟件。它最令人擔(dān)憂的特性不是所謂變成惡性超級(jí)大腦的傾向，而是它的不透明性。
“人工智能”是一個(gè)“黑盒”。經(jīng)過適當(dāng)“訓(xùn)練”后，它可以做一些表面上驚人的事情，例如圖像處理，它還可能識(shí)別出人類觀察者未能發(fā)現(xiàn)的復(fù)雜數(shù)據(jù)模式。一個(gè)有用的工具。
在軟件/硬件組合經(jīng)過“訓(xùn)練”后，人工智能如何對(duì)查詢作出特定響應(yīng)的“過程”即使對(duì)軟件的創(chuàng)造者來說也是難以捉摸的。這就是危險(xiǎn)所在。對(duì)于那些對(duì)人工智能內(nèi)部運(yùn)作如同對(duì)計(jì)算尺一樣一無所知的人來說，他們可能錯(cuò)誤地信任人工智能的能力，或者可能因?qū)?dòng)機(jī)歸因于人工智能而產(chǎn)生非理性的恐懼。
Brayan Stoyanov
AI is not the problem. We are the problem because we don’t have the abilities to make our technological advances work in our favour. Instead we fall prey to them because of our greed and stupidity.
人工智能不是問題。我們才是問題，因?yàn)槲覀儧]有能力讓我們的技術(shù)進(jìn)步為我們所用。相反，由于我們的貪婪和愚蠢，我們成為技術(shù)的犧牲品。
Peter Bilski
AI computer suoercenters build now by Billioneres like Musk are intended to hijack global financial markets. For any trader accustomed with forex ir stock market it is obvious that computer could outperform every human trader. High frequency day tradeing will siphon all funds from market onto AI accounts. Unless countries will find new ways to control global markets this parasitic AI trader could suck money from market without any contribution to investment into real economy.
像馬斯克這樣的億萬富翁現(xiàn)在建造的人工智能超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)中心旨在劫持全球金融市場(chǎng)。對(duì)于任何熟悉外匯或股票市場(chǎng)的交易者來說，顯而易見，計(jì)算機(jī)可以超越每一個(gè)人類交易者。高頻日交易將把市場(chǎng)上的所有資金吸入人工智能賬戶。除非各國找到控制全球市場(chǎng)的新方法，這種寄生的人工智能交易者可能會(huì)從市場(chǎng)吸走資金，而對(duì)實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)的投資毫無貢獻(xiàn)。
Pragmatist_in_another_guise
Algorithmic trading – that is, decisions emanating from computers directly connected to the marketplace – must be curtailed.
Very rapid responses by tangles of computers talking one to another may potentially trigger cascades of buying or selling. Stock markets, back in the days when all trades were ‘by hand’ and took place in a human perceived timefrx, were subject to unanticipated ‘corrections’ and to occasional ‘crashes’; these, seemingly inevitable outbreaks of ‘chaotic’ behaviour relate to self-sustaining ‘feedback loops’ in a context of growing human panic. Computer algorithms lack emotion, but their remorseless application of an algorithm’s logic can trigger panic-like behaviour when algorithms, inevitably each constructed along similar lines, ‘compete’.
Algorithmic trading of this nature creates a hierarchy of traders. Even among computer-aided traders, this exists: major trading firms locate as closely as possible to exchanges because microsecond reductions in transmission time along fibre optics offer advantage. Groups trading at less intensity, e.g. pension funds which tend to seek reliable longer term assets, these not always based near exchanges, will get information about prices, and deals will be done, more slowly.
The ordinary person making direct deals via brokers, even should these be online and automated, is an inevitable major loser during market crashes; this is exacerbated by (in the UK) a fifteen-minute delay imposed upon conveying stock prices to the public. Seemingly, prices are (almost) proprietary information, and anyone wanting more rapid access must subscribe to the exchange: an iniquitous arrangement completely unjustified in the Internet era.
算法交易——即直接連接到市場(chǎng)的計(jì)算機(jī)發(fā)出的決策——必須受到限制。
計(jì)算機(jī)之間快速的交互可能引發(fā)買賣的級(jí)聯(lián)效應(yīng)。在過去，所有交易都“手工”進(jìn)行并在人類可感知的時(shí)間框架內(nèi)完成時(shí)，股票市場(chǎng)容易出現(xiàn)意料之外的“調(diào)整”和偶爾的“崩盤”；這些看似不可避免的“混亂”行為爆發(fā)，與在人類日益恐慌的背景下自我維持的“反饋循環(huán)”有關(guān)。計(jì)算機(jī)算法缺乏情感，但它們無情地應(yīng)用算法邏輯可能引發(fā)類似恐慌的行為，當(dāng)算法不可避免地按照相似的方式構(gòu)建并“競爭”時(shí)。
這種性質(zhì)的算法交易創(chuàng)造了交易者的等級(jí)。即使在計(jì)算機(jī)輔助交易者中，這種情況也存在：主要交易公司盡可能靠近交易所，因?yàn)楣饫w傳輸時(shí)間的微秒減少提供了優(yōu)勢(shì)。交易強(qiáng)度較低的群體，例如傾向于尋求可靠長期資產(chǎn)的養(yǎng)老基金，這些不總是在交易所附近，將更慢地獲取價(jià)格信息，交易也會(huì)更慢完成。
通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人直接交易的普通人，即使這些交易是在線和自動(dòng)化的，在市場(chǎng)崩盤時(shí)也必然是主要的輸家；在英國，對(duì)公眾傳遞股價(jià)施加的15分鐘延遲加劇了這種情況?？此苾r(jià)格（幾乎）是專有信息，任何想要更快訪問的人必須訂閱交易所：這種不公平的安排在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)時(shí)代完全沒有理由。
qudy qerban
AI is far from intelligence, artificial or otherwise. It is Atrocious Imposition on humanity by some A$$hole Intellectuals.
人工智能遠(yuǎn)非智能，無論是人工還是其他。它是一些混蛋知識(shí)分子對(duì)人類的可怕強(qiáng)加。